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A NEW ACCOUNT OF EXPERT/LAY
CONFLICTS OF RISK INTUITION
HOWARD MARGOLIS*
The prevailing view of expert versus lay conflicts of risk intuition
on such matters as nuclear waste and pesticides is that experts focus
on a very narrow range of consequences, but ordinary people have a
much richer sense of what is involved in choices about risk.1  Experts
may feel comfortable with a level of precaution that seems wholly in-
adequate to ordinary people because experts typically assess risks in
terms of quantitative measures, while ordinary citizens care a great
deal about qualitative aspects of risk, such as voluntariness, how far
authorities responsible for managing the risk have earned their trust,
and about risk to future generations. In a recent book (henceforth
DWR2), I argue that this widely accepted view is, in fact, wrong.  I
sketch here, but of course can only sketch (not argue in detail) a con-
trary view.  So this surely will be insufficient to persuade a skeptical
reader, but it will at least put the possibility on the table.
I work out an account that turns on how all of us tend to miss
cues that do not tie readily to our experience in the world. There are
(almost) always opportunities foregone when we take precautions,
and danger accepted when we do not.  Good judgment—judgment
that will look reasonable when the passions of the moment have
passed—has to deal with what I label the “fungibility” (between op-
portunities and dangers) that ordinarily confronts us.3  A person, and
a society, needs to seek a prudent balance between the advantages of
boldness and the advantages of caution.  We cannot have all we want
of one without giving up what is likely to turn out to be more than we
want to give up of the other.
As a matter of good sense, no one really can doubt that. But
cognitively—that is, as a matter of how our brains actually work,
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which may be far from how we suppose or would want our brains to
work—it is easy to miss one side or the other (danger or opportu-
nity), so that fungibility is lost.  Then we will be easily prompted to
very firm intuitions that treat one side or the other as negligible, even
when that is not at all plausible as an assessment of what is actually
known about the situation.  This yields cases in which experts are
worried but ordinary people are hard to persuade (as in the case of
seat belts, cigarette smoking, and so on). There are converse cases
where ordinary citizens are very worried about something that ex-
perts perceive as not very serious. In DWR, I show how following up
this line of analysis leads both to an account of stubborn expert/lay
controversies in either direction, and also to an account of how peo-
ple respond to the psychometric surveys that underlie the usual view.4
And it also suggests something about a step that might be inserted
into the process (what I call the “do no harm” assessment) which
might alleviate at least some of the difficulty we see.5
I can only open the door to that story in the space available here,
mainly by developing a point that every reader in some at least casual
way already knows: namely that correlation does not guarantee cau-
sation.  Beyond doubt, responses on the psychometric dimensions
correlate with lay perceptions of risk.  But that the risk perceptions at
issue are caused by the responses on these qualitative dimensions is
something I want to put in question.  And, if that skepticism is war-
ranted, it would have consequences both for pragmatic and for nor-
mative appraisal of how a free society would best respond to this di-
lemma of conflicting expert versus lay intuitions.
Trust is item 12 on Vincent Covello’s list of 19 dimensions of risk
that have shown up as significant influences on lay perceptions in
psychometric studies (fig. 1).6  But placement in that list is not in-
tended to reflect relative importance.  In this instance it conspicu-
ously does not. Loss of trust is the most common explanation of ex-
pert/lay conflicts. The claim is that the public has lost trust in the
huge corporate or government actors seeking to assure us that the in-
terests of ordinary citizens are being respected.7 But if one party (the
public) does not believe what another is saying (here, some corporate
4. See id.
5. See id. at 165-89.
6. See COVELLO, supra note 1, at 112.  The list was developed from the work of Slovic,
Fischoff, and collaborators, see generally SLOVIC, supra note 1, at 183-94.
7. See, e.g., Paul Slovic et al., Perceived Risk, Trust, and the Politics of Nuclear Waste, 254
SCIENCE 1603 (1991).
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or government agency), it is tautological that A does not trust B, at
least with respect to this issue. So while it is plain that the public is
not reassured by the assurances of the Department of Energy with
respect to nuclear waste, it does not follow that the public disbelieves
what it is told because it does not trust the source. An alternative ex-
planation is that the public does not trust the source because it can-
not believe the message. Or the explanation may fall somewhere in
between: while distrust is real, it has major consequences on particu-
lar issues (and not so on many others) because those are the very is-
sues about which the public would have difficulty believing assur-
ances, even from some entity in which it had great trust.
There is plenty of evidence for at least the compromise view
(where disbelief causes distrust as much as distrust causes disbelief).8
The most direct comes from the very data commonly cited to show
that people do not trust the organizations trying to be reassuring.
Polls routinely show a declining level of trust in government and cor-
porate actors. But those same polls show a continuing high level of
trust in doctors and scientists.9 Yet reassuring reports from distin-
guished panels of scientists and doctors on issues of conspicuous ex-
pert/lay conflict seem to have no great impact, which surely argues
that there is something about particular issues or contexts, not simply
something about corporate or government actors, that is prompting
disbelief.
But parallel concerns about a possible confusion of cause and ef-
fect arise with respect to all 19 of the psychometric dimensions on
Covello’s exhaustive list.  And it is certainly important to consider
how far the qualitative dimensions that make up such lists actually
provide reasons that explain conflicts of intuition, or only rationaliza-
tions that defend intuitions that have their roots somewhere else. The
most transparent, as well as the most pervasive, illustration of ambi-
guity over what is cause and what is effect is provided by the trust is-
sue just discussed.10 It is an automatic entry in a list like that of figure
1, since on any conceivable view of the matter, if people do not be-
lieve what you tell them, they do not trust what are saying. Since it is
8. See MARGOLIS, supra note 2, at 29-32.
9. JAMES A. DAVIS & TOM W. SMITH, NATIONAL OPINION RESEARCH CENTER,
GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEYS, 1972-1993: CUMULATIVE CODEBOOK 823-48 (1994); ORTWIN
RENN & DEBRA LEVINE, Credibility and Trust in Risk Communication, in COMMUNICATING
RISKS TO THE PUBLIC 175, 203-209 (Roger E. Kasperson & Pieter J.M. Stallen, eds., 1991).
10. See MARGOLIS, supra note 2, at 41-42.
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an automatic entry, its mere presence tells us nothing whatsoever
about whether it is cause or only effect.
Figure 1:  Covello’s list (Covello, supra note 1, at 112)
Factor Conditions associated with
increased public concern
Conditions associated with
decreased public concern
1. Catastrophic potential Fatalities and injuries
grouped in time and space
Fatalities scattered and ran-
dom
2. Familiarity Unfamiliar Familiar
3. Understanding Mechanisms or process not
understood
Mechanisms or process un-
derstood
4. Uncertainty Risks scientifically un-
known or uncertain
Risks known to science
5. Controllability (personal) Uncontrollable Controllable
6. Voluntariness of exposure Involuntary Voluntary
7. Effects on children Children specifically at risk Children not specifically at
risk
8. Effects manifestation Delayed effects Immediate effects
9. Effects on future genera-
tions
Risk to future generations No risk to future generations
10. Victim identity Identifiable victims Statistical victims
11. Dread Effects dreaded Effects not dreaded
12. Trust in institutions Lack of trust in responsible
institutions
Trust in responsible institu-
tions
13. Media attention Much media attention Little media attention
14. Accident history Major and sometimes minor
accidents
No major or minor accidents
15. Equity Inequitable distribution of
risks and benefits
Equitable distribution of
risks and benefits
16. Benefits Unclear benefits Clear benefits
17. Reversibility Effects irreversible Effects reversible
18. Personal stake Individual personally at risk Individual not personally at
risk
19. Origin Caused by human actions or
failures
Caused by acts of nature or
God
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However, there is actually a much more striking warning signal
which is only rarely discussed, though it is “hidden in plain sight” in
lists of psychometric dimensions. Anyone who talks informally to
people concerned about environmental risks (and surely we all do
that) will find that the first response to questions about risk is in-
variably that the activity or substance is dangerous. Lack of trust is
then the characteristic next response to the follow-up question: Why
worry if the experts say it is not a worrisome thing? But when the ar-
gument takes its next turn, discussion readily moves to the full-blown
possibility that what the lay public means by dangerous is not the
same as what an expert is likely to mean by dangerous. We come to
the possibility of rival rationalities where responses are different, but
not necessarily in a way that makes one wrong whenever the other is
right.
This sequence makes sense.  But it is not what the psychometric
work reports.  If you look through even as extensive a survey of the
psychometric dimensions as the 19 in figure 1, you will find that ex-
pected harm, or something equivalent to that, appears nowhere.  In-
tensity of worry and actuarial information on expected fatalities turn
out to be essentially uncorrelated.11  That raises a severe difficulty for
the “rival rationalities” story.  It is not surprising that Wildavsky, as a
principal critic of what he took to be excessive environmental wor-
ries, was convinced that what research on lay attitudes shows is that
lay intuition is driven by qualitative features, ignoring quantitative
features entirely.12 But at least for radiation and chemicals (that is, for
just the areas where stark expert/lay conflicts are most often encoun-
tered), the leading contributor to the rival rationality view also re-
ports that “there appears to be little relationship between the magni-
tude of risk assessed by experts (health physicists, epidemiologist,
and toxicologists) and the magnitude of perceived risks.” 13
But surely it is bizarre to suppose that likely damage is not even
an important factor in lay perception.  It is reasonable to want an ex-
planation of why that is so inconsequential in the psychometric work
as to be missing entirely from Covello’s list. Actual danger appar-
ently rates no higher than twentieth on a list of what accounts for lay
perception of risk! But if an array of possibilities at all comparable to
11. See id. at 34.
12. Aaron Wildavsky & Karl Dake, Theories of Risk Perception: Who Fears What and
Why, 119 DAEDALUS 41, 51-57 (1990).
13. PAUL SLOVIC, Perception of Risk: Reflections on the Psychometric Paradigm, in
SOCIAL THEORIES OF RISK 117, 127 (Sheldon Krinsky & Dominic Golding, eds., 1992).
120 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol 8:115
Covello’s list is offered, then perceived risk and anything else (such
as nearly all the items listed in fig. 1) are also only modestly corre-
lated, though with a long enough list of worrisome items we can, of
course, account for whatever we happen to observe. On the other
hand, the sheer multiplicity of the dimensions that do correlate with
perceived risk is also a puzzle.  There are just too many, and espe-
cially too many that apparently correlate better than actual damage
does.  In DWR, I try to provide a detailed resolution of this puzzle
through an exercise in “inverting Covello’s list.” 14
In sum, a study like DWR could not have been undertaken with-
out the point of departure pioneered by Slovic, Fischoff, and their
colleagues. But the absence of expected damage from the psychomet-
ric dimensions raises a flagrant warning signal that something odd is
going on. For as every reader will find from introspection, and con-
firm by inquiring among even her most zealously committed envi-
ronmentalist friends, no one in fact regards expected damage as the
almost irrelevant factor the psychometric studies (on their face) find
it to be.  
Suppose we temporarily set aside dread (item 11 on Covello’s
list).  And set aside distrust (item 12), since we have already noticed
that it is automatically a reason whenever expert/lay intuitions stub-
bornly conflict, independent of any particular account of what is
causing the conflict. Trust is also qualitatively different from other
dimensions of the psychometric list, for trust as an explanation is not
inconsistent with lay judgment turning on just the same considera-
tions as expert judgment. So trust is not intrinsically part of a rival ra-
tionalities (or of an ideological) story. But consider some other items
that, like trust, might prompt us to wonder whether there may be
substantial confusion between what is the cause of a perception of
risk and what is a consequence of a perception of risk. The most con-
spicuous candidates are press attention (item 13) and accident record
(item 14), which are tightly linked. For example, item 14 (“major and
sometimes minor accidents”) by itself hardly makes any sense. All
technologies, and indeed all human activities, involve at least minor
and usually also some risk of more serious accidents. Therefore, eve-
rything would go into the “greater concern” category of figure 1.
However, perceived accidents are what are relevant here.
Suppose we tend to fix in memory incidents related to some risks
and take no special notice of comparable incidents involving other
14. See MARGOLIS, supra note 2, at 99-119.
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risks. Then apparently there is some underlying propensity to see
some risks as saliently worrisome, so that we are very ready to notice
and remember anything that fits with that disposition.  But the media
attends mainly to what we are interested in hearing about, which
prompts special media attention to just such risks.  And, in turn, that
press attention reinforces the background propensity. So there is
great public concern about transport of nuclear waste—it might pro-
vide the most extreme point for a ratio of expert-to-lay concerns. But
the safety record for shipments of nuclear waste is “gold star.” We
worry a lot about nuclear waste shipments, even if the record is gold
star. A nuclear waste truck that was driven into a ditch injuring no-
body would be news to any editor as obviously as a similar accident
involving almost any cargo other than nuclear waste would be of no
interest whatever.
In 1986, a truck carrying low-level nuclear waste took a wrong
turn at the Queensborough Bridge in New York and became jammed
into an overpass too low for the height of the truck. There were no
injuries and no leakage of radioactive material. But this common-
place accident is nevertheless familiar to anyone interested in nuclear
waste transportation and was the subject of intense investigation and
local news coverage. 15  Since the event was trivial in terms of what it
ordinarily takes to make news in a vast city like New York, the case is
unambiguous as an example of how prior disposition to perceive
danger prompted concern, which prompted intense press coverage,
which (for a time) spread and reinforced concern about an incident
that would have been treated as trivial had nuclear waste not been
involved.
Further, ambiguity of cause and effect arises even where there is
a clearly reasonable basis for an influence on risk perception. Volun-
tariness of risks (item 6) is conspicuous here, since how strongly peo-
ple sense voluntariness (or its absence) turns out to be substantially
subjective, and not simply a property that a computer or a human
being outside the social situation could understand. The paradigmatic
example of an activity with large expected fatalities (the conspicuous
criterion by which experts rate riskiness), but where lay perceptions
of risk are modest on psychometric responses, is driving a car. Every-
one is familiar with auto accidents: almost everyone can recall near
misses, where serious injury could easily have occurred; spectacular
15. ROGER E. KASPERSON, The Social Amplification of Risk: Progress in Developing an
Integrative Framework, in SOCIAL THEORIES OF RISK 153, 170 (Sheldon Krinsky & Dominic
Golding, eds., 1992).
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examples are common items of news reports. More than 40,000 peo-
ple a year are killed in the United States.16 But almost none of us ex-
hibit the intensity of concern about auto safety that many people ex-
hibit about the possibility of nuclear waste shipments going anywhere
near their city. A public that never exhibited regret at being required
to wear a seat belt on an airplane for a generation resisted wearing a
belt in a car. Yet even the dimmest citizen is likely to understand that
the prospect that wearing a belt would do some good in the event of a
crash is surely at least as good for the car as for the plane.
The lack of concern about driving a car can be explained mainly
in terms of voluntariness. Yet traveling by car is not really a volun-
tary choice for most of us. And even for the driver, many aspects of
auto dangers are not voluntary in any reasonable sense at all. The
obvious examples are risks from drunk drivers, who kill many people
besides themselves, and highway design, which has strong effects on
the risk of fatal crashes. Both drunk drivers and less than maximally
safe highways kill vastly more people than are plausibly killed by the
disputed handling of all radiation or chemicals combined. Exposing
yourself to the risks of drunk drivers and less than maximally safe
highways is scarcely more voluntary (item 6) or more natural (item
19) than eating foods that contain pesticide residues, but only much
more likely to kill you. However, it is pesticides that we worry about
and for which we doubt that government regulation can be trusted to
be adequately careful. In general, there is a large amount of arbi-
trariness in what is perceived as voluntary, and the same holds for
every other item in Covello’s list. But once we understand that char-
acteristics like “voluntariness” in the rival rationalities argument
means perceived voluntariness, then a very wide door is open for ri-
val rationalities to be invoked to rationalize any response, from ig-
noring flagrant risks to intense concern about nonexistent risks.
Continuing on the list, familiarity (item 2) is plausible as some-
thing reassuring, while unfamiliarity is a cue to something worth wor-
rying about. But some things seem to stay unfamiliar even after they
have been around a long time. After tens of thousands of shipments
of nuclear waste around the world with no notable accidents, the idea
of shipping nuclear wastes remains fearfully novel and unfamiliar.
Understanding (item 3) makes Covello’s list. But is it true that in
general we understand nuclear waste storage less than we understand
why the plane we are riding on does not fall out of the sky? Other
16. ROBERT N. ANDERSON ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., Report
of Final Mortality Statistics, 1995, MONTHLY VITAL STATISTICS REPORT, June 12, 1997, at 23.
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items in figure 1 have the character that, if indeed they are important
factors, they would be more puzzling than explanatory. Why would
uncertainty (item 4) be worrisome for subtle risks where the uncer-
tainty resides in whether a nonzero risk even exists?  For many of the
cases in which uncertainty is cited (e.g., uncertainty over modest per-
turbations of radiation exposure relative to natural background) are
of just that character. A common account of this involves some claim
that there are “many orders of magnitude” of uncertainty. But if the
lower bound is zero, then any positive upper bound, however small,
gives a range with an infinite number of orders of magnitude of un-
certainty. So the “many orders of magnitude” claim may be both per-
fectly accurate and perfectly trivial, but still scary even when trivial.
Why would someone be more concerned about delayed risk
(item 8) than a risk that will come promptly? Would anyone actually
prefer a given risk of cancer discovered tomorrow to the same risk of
cancer discovered after 20 years’ delay? Personal controllability is
item 5 on the list. But for how many people would having a chauffeur
seem daunting, since they no longer would be in control of the car?
Yet it would be a mistake to focus too narrowly on particular items,
since the general difficulty with the psychometric list lies not in par-
ticular items, but in something characteristic of the list as an aggre-
gate. It is truly a buffet with something to suit any taste.
Are victims identifiable? Then item 10 enhances worry. On the
other hand, if the victims are statistical or otherwise unidentifiable,
that will also be worrisome (items 3, 4, 8, and 9 could all come into
play). Is the victim me? Then items 5, 6, and 18 could be useful. But if
the victim is not me, then 7, 9, and 15 will be useful. Am I worried
though there is no sign or evidence of damage? Then 3, 4, 8, 9, and of
course 1 are all available. That I cannot see any effect makes sense if
the danger is in the future, or by some not-understood mechanism (so
I don’t know where to look), or a risk of catastrophe (so although I
have not seen it yet, it might be just around the corner). And so on.
Of particular interest here is the concern over fairness
(obviously, item 15 but others also, notably 7, 16, and 18). For we find
lots of evidence of reversals of usual ethical judgments, since ethical
judgments ordinarily follow what I elsewhere call the NSNX princi-
ple (“neither selfish nor exploited”).17  We ordinarily see it as selfish
for an individual to insist on absolute protection of his rights and
17. Howard Margolis, Free-riding and Cooperation, in STRATEGY AND CHOICE 83, 95-100
(Richard J. Zeckhauser, ed., 1991).
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property with no regard for the costs to others or to society generally.
We usually see a person who demands that others accept large costs
to avoid trivial infringement on his rights as selfish, or stupid, even if
we allow that he is within his rights. We do not see that as morally
admirable, and we do not feel that it is unfair if the community is less
than sympathetic to people demanding their rights when no signifi-
cant harm is threatened. Eventually, social norms and even criminal
law put limits on how selfish a person can be without punishment. So
what is fair is not always a simple matter, and cause/effect ambigui-
ties arise also on this item. Fairness, and how ambiguities involving
fairness are resolved, eventually play an important role in the argu-
ment of DWR, since the principal reform proposal (what I call a “do
no harm” proposal) is tied to that.18
A particular dilemma arises with the item set aside earlier: dread
(item 11). For here the problem is not just to sort out which way the
causal arrow goes, but to see what the point is of including as a
claimed cause something that (in this context) seems indistinguish-
able from the effect to be explained. Dread is easily understood as an
additional and reasonable consideration in a context like that of a
woman who has been raped: She might intensely want to avoid situa-
tions in which she would have to so much as think about the possibil-
ity of an attack. But even in this kind of case (and much more easily
in cases of dread of snakes, spiders, lightning, or flying), a person may
come to see their own situation as one of excessive concern and seek
to overcome it or distract it, not rationalize it. But in our psychomet-
ric context, dread seems to mean only that concern about this source
of risk has a visceral quality beyond logic, hence (for logically slight
risks) tautologically must exceed what an expert assessment would
judge reasonable. But with 18 other candidates on the list, we might
suppose that dread would be redundant. The other 18 items, we
might expect, would explain dread. That dread itself is an element re-
flects the fact that even a list of 18—17 not counting the automati-
cally available trust—does not do a good enough job of accounting
for striking expert/lay conflicts of intuition. We need, apparently, to
add a catch-all category (dread) for cases in which everything else
fails. Suppose we try an analysis of why some marriages stay together
while so many others end in divorce. And suppose that after consid-
ering 18 contributors to successful marriages, so much of the variance
is unaccounted for that a basket category—essentially identical with
18. MARGOLIS, supra note 2, at 165-89.
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just what was supposed to be explained (like “happy home”)—also
had to be thrown in. No doubt married couples with a happy home
life rarely seek divorce, and no doubt risks that inspire a high level of
dread are worrisome, but does either explain rather than merely de-
scribe what is under examination?
But let us return to the absence from Covello’s list of expected
fatalities, or some other usual measure of danger. Even if we take the
items on the list as unproblematically causative, one might have sup-
posed that it is when danger in its usual sense is present that lay sensi-
tivities to other dimensions of risk would be heightened. The absence
of the most common indicator of risk (probability of death or serious
injury) might suggest that what we are looking at is not really a list of
extra dimensions that worry lay people but a list of things that might
be used to rationalize lay concern in the absence of evidence of dan-
ger in its usual sense.
So the question reasonably arises: since the primary response to
riskiness of ordinary people (not just experts) is to mention danger
(meaning, if you ask, what you would expect, i.e., danger of killing
people, of causing cancers, etc.), then why is it that this usual focus of
expert analysis is nowhere on the psychometric list?
Douglas and Wildavsky have argued that cultures select risks to
serve other purposes than avoiding physical harm.19  No doubt there
is some merit to that claim. All the same, it seems to be going much
too far to suppose that physical danger has nothing to do with what is
perceived as dangerous.
But suppose that lay concern is not essentially caused by giving a
(much) greater weight to qualitative dimensions than experts would
give, but by something quite outside the psychometric list.  Then it
might be that the sense of visceral risk prompts elevated responses to
items on Covello’s list, rather than the other way around.  In DWR, I
give a detailed account of how that inversion of the psychometric di-
mensions might work.20  The cause/effect ambiguities for these quali-
tative dimensions make it less surprising that psychometric responses
do not correlate well with statistical risk. The reason for that turns on
noticing that expert/lay controversies seem invariably about statisti-
cal risks very much smaller than risks we ordinarily attend to. If you
ordinarily worried about risks unless they were at or below EPA’s
one-in-a-million standard, then you would have time to do nothing
19. MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE 1-15 (1982).
20. MARGOLIS, supra note 2, at 99-119.
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else all day long than take note of all the risks you are running.  A
decided peculiarity of sharp expert/lay controversy, then, is that it is
almost always associated with risks so statistically remote that ordi-
narily they would not prompt any sense of visceral risk at all.21
But it is in just that sort of case where it would be hardest for
cues necessarily acquired from everyday experience to function in
their ordinarily reliable way. Hence it is also for just such risks (that
is, for statistically very subtle risks) that it would most easily happen
that perceived risk—the visceral sense of risk that is at issue here—
could show little connection with statistical risk, as if “kills few” ver-
sus “kills a lot” or something of that nature were important only for
experts and of almost no interest to the rest of us.
Consider a contrast between a fractionally microscopic risk of
cancer and a microscopic fraction of some large budget—say a few
million dollars spent by the Department of Energy on a cleanup.
Human judgment is pervasively marked by anchor-and-adjust effects.
Far more than we consciously notice, we are somehow cued into a
“ballpark,” and then we adjust from there.  Even if no good cues to
the right ballpark are available, we are remarkably apt to use what-
ever does happen to be available.  Kahneman and Tversky demon-
strated very big effects on such things as estimates of the population
of unfamiliar foreign countries by spinning a carnival wheel in front
of the groups of college students making the estimate: the groups
clearly anchored on whatever number showed up on the wheel.22
Many other experiments have confirmed such effects, as well as much
public opinion research showing that recent salient news items will
sometimes have huge effects when they have little competition in
providing the anchor for public responses.23
In the context we are considering, even one chance in a million
of a cancer gives us something to anchor on that we can recognize:
some single individual with cancer, and we all know someone who
has died of cancer.  I expect every reader will be able to feel the tug
of this anchor, but that virtually no reader has any such immediate
intuitive sense of what is lost by DOE wasting a million dollars of its
budget.  It isn’t that, if challenged, you could not come up with some-
thing.  But one side (the danger) is something with an immediate in-
21. Id. at 95-96.
22. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Bi-
ases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974).
23. See, e.g., SHANTO IYENGAR & DONALD R. KINDER, NEWS THAT MATTERS:
TELEVISION AND AMERICAN OPINION 34-46 (1987).
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tuitive bite, and the other side (the opportunity foregone by ineffi-
ciently spending $1 million of the DOE budget) has almost no bite at
all.
An important aspect of this turns on the powerful propensity of
humans to yearn for reasoning.  This lies behind the propensity to re-
ligion, to science, and to a great deal else, some of which (we tend to
think) seems admirable, and some of which seems an embarrassment.
Cancer has a special role here because it differs from other major
contributors to human mortality except accidents and war (and that
qualification does not contravene the argument sketched next).  Un-
like heart and circulation disease (the other two current major kill-
ers) cancer is not readily assimilated to our sense that as things get
old they wear out.  And unlike what used to be the dominant killers
(contagious diseases), we do not have a well-entrenched supply of so-
cial lore about just what causes the harm.  Cancer somehow invades
otherwise healthy organs of the bodies, and then insidiously spreads
to other parts of the body until a person is killed.  That leaves us very
open, indeed eager to grasp at, something blameable which might be
causing this terrible thing.  And that propensity to find a reason-why
makes cancer an especially effective prompter of concern, feeding
into the anchor-and-adjust process already sketched.  There is a good
deal more to this story.  Some is sketched in DWR, and more else-
where.24
But now consider that differential intuitive force of danger
(especially in the form of cancer), as against fractionally tiny budget
misallocations.  I want to put that into the more general context of
what I call the risk matrix (fig. 2).  In DWR, this simple scheme for
categorizing responses to risk is used extensively in working out a de-
tailed account of expert vs. lay conflicts of risk intuition.25  In the risk
matrix, whether the cost of accepting a risk is on-screen is arrayed
against whether the cost of opportunity foregone by taking precau-
tions is on-screen.  Both sorts of cost are to be understood in a wide
and intuitive sense, by no means limited to costs or risks measurable
in dollars, even in the case of a person inclined to assess things that
way. On the other hand it is the costs (and negative costs: benefits)
that are on-screen for a person, not what an expert might assert ought
to be considered, that must be relevant to a person’s perception of
risk.
24. See Howard Margolis, What’s Special About Cancer?, in CULTURE MATTERS: ESSAYS
IN HONOR OF AARON WILDAVSKY 133 (Richard J. Ellis & Michael Thompson, eds., 1997).
25. MARGOLIS, supra note 2, at 71-97.
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Figure 2: The risk matrix (after Margolis, supra note 2, at 76).
In the lower-right cell 4, neither the cost of (marginal) precau-
tions nor the (marginal) risk of not taking precautions are salient.
The whole situation is off-screen. We may know it is there, but it is
not a focus of active attention. But in cell 1, a person is alert to the
situation, with the costs that go with the risk on-screen, and also the
costs of taking precautions against that risk. What characterizes this
context is fungibility: we are in a situation where we can see a need to
consider, and usually a need to somehow balance or trade off, the ad-
vantages of caution against the advantages of boldness. Usually, we
must give up values on one dimension to secure values on the other.
For the remaining two cells (2 and 3), either costs or benefits,
but not both, are on-screen. Response is dominated by one side or
the other, and intuition is then governed in a one-sided way either by
“waste not” intuitions (cell 3) or “better safe” intuitions (cell 2).
When the response is active but contested (cell 1), we can expect
an attempt to reach some balanced judgment, to see both sides of an
argument, to seek expert advice, and so on. If we reach a balance, so
that nothing much seems to be gained by shifting a bit either toward
more boldness or more caution, we will eventually slip to cell 4. For if
we have no clear preference about which way to move, we come to
feel comfortable with, or at least resigned to, where we are.
Suppose two individuals with differing experience face the same
risk; then one person might see “waste not” while another sees
“better safe.” That would be no more surprising (for individuals with
OPPORTUNITY
YES NO
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NO
DANGER
Fungibility
“Better safe than
sorry”
“Waste not, want
not” Indifference
  1 2
 3 4
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different experience in the world — e.g., one is an expert in this mat-
ter and the other is not) than that one of a pair of animals choosing to
fight in a context where another chooses to flee. But human beings,
unlike other creatures, often face choices in which one decision must
be made for all (we make social choices, not just individual choices).
If the choice is social, I am stuck with your choice unless you are
stuck with mine. We face a “locked-in” situation, where a person may
have no way to respond to visceral discomfort, since by himself he
cannot move (or can only move at a cost that seems unreasonable) to
a more comfortable setting. And as social creatures we may be called
upon to vote or otherwise influence a choice that involves other peo-
ple. So even when we are not personally at risk, we may experience
visceral discomfort at the situation being imposed on other people.
Expert/lay conflicts can arise for both situations — individual or
social choice — because in any context at all, there will be cues that
are subtle or complicated or otherwise difficult to use for an inexpe-
rienced person, but are familiar and automatically significant for the
experienced person. Just what we mean by expert is that a person has
a lot of experience on some matter. A pair of individuals with very
similar intelligence and values may be responding differently to a
common set of cues. Subjectively they see different situations, though
both agree that objectively it is the same situation. But why that is
happening cannot be directly observed, since what governs our intui-
tions, and the way we use (or discard, or never notice) cues are inac-
cessible to direct perception.
For social issues, if the predominant lay response is firmly in cell
2, political realities will easily push precautions beyond what seems
sensible to expert judgment; this puts experts in cell 3. But pragmatic
constraints on how much expense and inconvenience can be managed
will often halt precautions well short of what will move lay judgment
out of cell 2. So we get a polarized situation, where a one-sided sense
of the situation for some set of individuals (mainly lay) eventually
leads to an opposing gestalt for another class of individuals (mainly
expert). People with one kind of experience in the world find them-
selves in cell 2, while others—equally intelligent, well-motivated, and
so on—find themselves in cell 3. Looking across that axis from either
side, a person sees people whose judgment is perverse, narrow, un-
trustworthy, and so on.
Such reactions can occur even when only individual choices are
at issue: I think it is pathetic that you are so timid, you think it is
crazy that I am so reckless. But the conflicts will be most intense in
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the context of social choice, since both sides are locked into living
with a common choice, which looks too timid to one side and too
reckless to the other. And it is also in the context of social judgments
that social knowledge (what “everyone knows”) is particularly likely
to have taken hold, and further constrain the possibility of mere rea-
soning to shift intuitions.
But the story, to this point, can be read in a way that still fits
comfortably with the “usual story”, where expert intuition is focused
narrowly on statistical expectations of damage, but lay intuition is
shaped by many other dimensions.  Although it is indeed the con-
trasting experience of experts and nonexperts that accounts for the
conflicting intuitions, what is most important about that contrast is
that the experience of experts makes them focus narrowly on what
they have been trained to attend to. Lay intuition is no doubt not so
fluent at responding to subtle information about statistical risks. But,
in the usual story, what is accounting for the stubborn conflicts is less
what experts see that other people miss, but what ordinary people feel
about risk that experts neglect. But I have from the start made it clear
that I want to present a very different interpretation, where “off-
screen/on-screen” is a far more starkly dichotomous response than
we can consciously notice or would consciously prefer.  I try to sup-
port that with a good deal of detailed evidence from the cognitive
payoff literature of recent decades.
So long as both danger and opportunity are off-screen, the mat-
ter is left to others (bureaucrats, experts, politicians, or even persons
unknown). If both danger and opportunity are on-screen, then we
have fungibility and, consequently, an awakened interest in whether
the matter is being well handled. Ordinarily that means relying on the
judgment of people with particular experience with the matter. But
outside the range of normal experience, cases in which we are alerted
to both danger and opportunity are least common, cases in which we
are alerted to neither are most common, and the cases in which many
people are alerted to either danger or opportunity, but not both, al-
though rarer than the “neither” case (cell 4), are just those that gen-
erate controversy and hence come to wide attention. 
Logically, that is not how we would expect our brains to work.
But cognitively there is a great deal of evidence (a fair sampling re-
viewed in DWR) that in fact things commonly do work that way.26
Then we will be easily prompted to very firm intuitions that treat one
26. Id. at 49-69.
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side or the other (danger or opportunity) as negligible even when
that is not at all plausible as an assessment of the relative magnitudes
given what is actually known about the situation. We get cases in
which experts are worried but ordinary people are hard to persuade
(as for some years held for seat belts, cigarette smoking, etc.). And
we get converse cases in which ordinary citizens are very worried
about what risks experts see as not very serious. I would argue that
these polarized expert/lay cases for environmental risks should ulti-
mately be seen as a special category of the more general phenome-
non of social and political polarization, but here I will just conclude
with some summary remarks about the consequences for environ-
mental matters.
On this view, the characteristic case will be one where danger
ordinarily too remote to win attention is on-screen, often because it is
related to cancer and its special aspects noted earlier, hence provides
the anchor for intuitions.  But what might be seen as relevant offset-
ting opportunities do not get on-screen, as also discussed earlier.
And so long as danger is on-screen but opportunity off, fungibility is
lost.  You are in “better safe than sorry” cell 2 of the risk matrix, with
consequences already reviewed.  A more adequate account, as
spelled out in DWR,27 needs to consider “3 F’s”: framing and fairness,
as well as fungibility, though I cannot get to that here.  But the result
is that we reach an account which makes sense of stubborn expert/lay
conflicts of intuition without supposing that only experts care about
how far anyone is actually hurt (or helped) by the regulatory choices
we make.
This account invites a straightforward empirical test.  Sometimes
situations arise—even more strikingly, sometimes a given situation
changes—so that the opportunity side which on the risk matrix argu-
ment had been cognitively invisible gets pushed on-screen.  But then
we ought to see a striking shift in lay response to the risk, and in lay
trust in experts who assess the risk as small.  I go through a series of
exemplary cases in DWR, for example the intense popular pressure
on Congress to block an FDA proposal to ban saccharin, which by
usual regulatory standards had to be considered a carcinogen.28
Across a varied array of such cases, we see what the risk matrix view
implies we ought to see.  And that (it seems to me, and as I argue in
the concluding chapters of DWR) has important normative implica-
27. Id. at 117-19.
28. Id. at 168-72.
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tions, since what seems to account for dramatic shifts in lay percep-
tions in these cases is not something objectively new—something that
logically was not part of the choice already—but something that was
there all along but very hard for anyone but an expert to see. But a
substantial part of why what is there is so often hard for anyone but
an expert to see is not that it is intrinsically beyond what lay judg-
ment can understand but because of the way Congress and courts and
regulators have set the process of reviewing environmental risks.
Readers of a law journal hardly need to be told that process is impor-
tant, and so although there is no space to do so here, I want to at least
mention that there are process reforms sketched out in the conclud-
ing chapters of DWR which might merit some attention.29
29. Id. at 145-205.
